14 January 2017 || .pdf available here: eisenhowers-future-theater-34
14 January 2017 || .pdf available here: eisenhowers-future-theater-34
It was just as Johnson had feared; the US were behind the Soviets in space. He was more stressed than the October night he saw Sputnik in the night sky. He recalled the Subcommittee session with Dr. Von Braun.
In von Braun’s arrogance he was convinced the Nazis were far more ahead in accurate, long-range ballistics than the mismanaged Soviet program, but that the US lagged behind the Soviets. The Soviets saw space as a next battleground, launching a satellite with potential military capabilities. The Soviets could spy over Earth, specifically on sensitive areas above the Earth and the US could do nothing.
The Soviets were ahead of the US in space, science, and technology and Johnson could not stand for that. He thought of space as a potential battleground, a place the Soviets might try to assert their Communist dominance. The US was lagged behind militarily, national defensively. Von Braun complained about the lack of scientists and surplus of engineers, given scientists and their distaste for technology. Scientists were technological skeptics.  The US needed to build and build quickly.
Johnson was not prepared to stand for the US failing behind in national defense technology. “We’re investigating this issue further,” he might have said to himself. Johnson sat at his desk and thought the matter over more carefully. He recalled Braun’s testimony after this afternoon’s session.
“What I think could be done is this,” Braun began, “Suppose, shall we call it, a National Space Agency were set up, either under the Secretary of Defense or as an independent agency, and this agency were given its own budget. We have made a detailed plan as to what it would take to run such a thing and just to quote a figure here, we are thinking about 1.5 billion a year. This is in addition, of course, to what is spent on the military missile programs. This money would be strictly for this long-range space program, for tlhe conquest of space. When forming this agency, it should also be clearly understood that this is a long-range proposition, that this yearly going rate would be something to plan and rely on, say, for the next 10 years.”
Von Braun continued, “Now, this Space Agency would have to set up its, own in-house master planning organization where competent people would plan a course of action, a stepwise course of action, on how to proceed to attain certain milestones. For example, to put a man into an orbit on a returnable basis within the next 5 years, and to have a manned space station, say, in 10 years. The Space Agency should also be free to let project management contracts in certain subareas included in the overall scope.
An independent agency, Johnson thought. A space agency. Von Braun’s suggestion echoed in his head.
“‘Your job is to get a man, on a returnable basis, into an orbit in 5 years,’ shall we say, ‘and you will build a space station in 10. Here is your own money. You can use the same industrial structure that supports the IRBM and ICBM and other projects, but the head of the Space Agency will make certain that he coordinates his contracts with the heads of the military missile agencies of the services.'”
Johnson remembers asking von Braun, “Why do you want to go to the Moon?” “Most certainly, when Columbus discovered America, he found very little here that was worth talking about and he could not possibly have possessed the imagination to predict all the things that developed on the continent he discovered. I think curiosity, and nothing else, should be the motivating power in exploration and research, and it is just curiosity why I would like
to go to the moon.” Curiousity indeed Johnson might have thought.
“Why do you think it is important that the free world get there first?” Johnson asked.
“Visiting the moon is only part of the overall concept of conquering space.” Conquering space Johnson thought. Indeed space was a taboo word in the Pentagon 6 months ago. Now agencies were fighting to take control of space first. If we were to create a new agency…
Johnson thought heavily on the matter. He still had another few days of hearings on the topic. He was still awaiting all information from the Pentagon on Sputnik and the military’s work in space and atmospheres.
Over the next few weeks, Johnson was busied with Congressional hearings and Press conferences.
Johnson later wrote a white paper criticizing both Democrats and Republicans in there stances towards space. He wrote, “The sad truth is that US progress in space has been continually hampered by the Republican administration’s blind refusal to recognize,e that we have engaged in s space and missile race with the Soviet Union and to act accordingly.”  He continued, “It is a fact that if any nation succeed in securing control of outer space, it will have the capability of controlling the earth itself.” 
Johnson was late to the next Congressional hearing on spaceflight in January of 1958 called “Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs.” He was in a conversation with Senator Saltonstall about holding a Democratic minority conference about the hearing held last November and December to review witness testimony. He showed up to the hearing ten minutes late.
Over the month of January, Johnson heard witness testimony from several Admirals and Generals from all the branches of the military – Army, Air Force, and Navy as well as executives from Lockheed, Northrop Aircraft, General Dynamics Corp, Western Electric, and Bell Telephone Labs.
 J. M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest, The MIT Press, 1970.
 Z. Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow: The President’s Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America., Rutgers University Press, 2008.
This article will attempt to study NASA’s budget as a distribution to investigate changes in NASA’s budget from the years 1957-2014 using cutting-edge theories in political science. Understanding NASA’s budget changes are the crucial first step in understanding how NASA’s budget may change and proponents of NASA might find whether NASA’s budget has been incremental or show punctuations very useful. This paper will use kurtosis mathematical methods and Robinson (2007) calculations for budget changes.
Using Policy Agendas Project coding data and Congressional hearing data, I am modeling the organizations that arise at Congressional NASA and spaceflight hearings during the Apollo Era, 1957-1969. The purpose of the project is to find out what agents have influenced Congress during the period that would end up sending man to the Moon. History suggests this was a very nationally defensive period in spaceflight and it will be important to chart whom Congress has spoken to on spaceflight as a policy issue and where Congress gets its information used when making decisions.
Full .pdf available here: eisenhowers-future-theater-33
Chapter 1: Sputnik
1.1 Congressional Preparedness Subcommittee
Senator Johnson sat presiding over the Congressional Preparedness Subcommittee at 10 am on a chilly Washington, DC morning along with Senators Johnson, Kefauver, Stennis, Symington, Saltonstall, and Flanders as well as members of the Congress’s special council. The group sat with members of the Armed Services Committee.
“Please come to order,” Senator Johnson said.
Senator Johnson would be presiding over a hearing called, “Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs” on the November afternoon almost two months after the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957.
Senator Johnson continued, “We are here today to inquire into the facts on the state of the
Nation’s security. Our country is disturbed over the tremendous military and scientific achievement of Russia. Our people have believed that in the field of scientific weapons and in technology and science, that we were well ahead of Russia. ”
The room was quiet. “With the launching of Sputniks I and II, and with the information
at hand of Russia’s strength, our supremacy and even our equality has been challenged. We must meet this challenge quickly and effectively in all its aspects,” Johnson reported.
Johnson remembers looking up at the night sky and seeing Sputnik and feeling distressed that the US was not first in science and technology, in space.  He began collecting information shortly from the Pentagon after Sputnik’s launch and assembled a list of witnesses to hear from to prepare a Congressional hearing on national defense and US science and technological security. His hope was to create a record to sort out all the media hype about satellites and guided missiles.
Johnson continued, “There are a few things I wish to make clear about the committees
attitude. It would appear that we have slipped dangerously behind the Soviet Union in some very important fields. But the committee is not rendering any final judgments in advance of the evidence, on why we slipped or what should be done about it. Our goal is to find out what is to be done. We will not reach that goal by wandering up any blind alleys of partisanship. I suppose that all of us, being human, have some ideas on steps that should be taken. But the committee judgment will represent a meeting of the minds after all the facts are available, and this committee’s judgment will represent an effort to make a contribution to the defense of our Nation. The facts that I learned so far give me no cause for comfort…”
Johnson called for unity between Democrats and Republicans. He brought up Pearl Harbor. “There were just Americans anxious to roll up their sleeves to close ranks and to wade into the enemy,” he said.
Johnson called the first witness, Dr. Edward Teller, known as the Father of the H-Bomb, now a professor at University of California Radiation Laboratory. Mr. Weisl was first to question the witness. “Will you please tell us, Dr. Teller, briefly, what your relationship to atomic and thermonuclear weapons has been since your arrival to this country?” Dr. Teller gave a brief summary of his travels to different laboratories and his eventual tenure at University of California.
“Have you participated very actively in the development of the hydrogen bomb?” Mr Weisl asked. “I have, yes, sir,” Dr. Teller responded. Senator Johnson interrupted, “Senator Symington is having trouble seeing the witness because of the photographers, and we have had a request to ask them to take their pictures and then move along.” Johnson shooed the audience of photographers to the side.
Mr Weisl asked Dr. Teller about the relationship between fissionable and thermonuclear long-range missiles. Dr. Teller told of ballistic missiles, long-range missiles could shoot 1,500 to 5,000 feet, however the missiles weren’t much for accuracy therefore the larger the explosive the greater the accuracy.
Mr. Weisl was concerned about accuracy, and asked Dr. Teller about “clean bombs” that is, bombs that are powerful enough to cause a powerful explosion that hits on target, rather than a long-range missile that requires a huge explosion to barely hit a target. Dr. Teller told Mr. Weisl such weapons require significant testing.
The questioning continued. Dr. Teller testified that Sputnik required a rocketry, a rocket motor, a guidance system, propulsion; and he discussed how these systems relate to ballistic missiles. If rocket technology could be adapted…
Mr. Weisl got to the heat of the argument: “Then you believe that the Russians have an intercontinental ballistic missile at this time? ” Dr. Teller responded that he did not know if the Russians had adapted rocketry technology to their ballistic missiles. The room was quiet; Mr. Weisl pressed Dr. Teller. “Dr. Teller, what must the Russians have in their
long-range guided missile, in addition to their ability to put a satellite in outer space, in order to hit a target?” Dr. Teller told Mr. Weisl about the problem of reentry when a rocket comes up the velocity that is inevitable on the come down would be a high speed and be a problem. Dr. Teller told the committee it was a problem the Russians could probably solve.
Mr. Weisl spoke, “Dr. Teller, why do you believe we are behind the Russians in the development of the long-range missile?” Dr. Teller told the committee the US is behind in ballistics and the Russian rocket technology is proof the US is behind. Dr. Weisl and Dr. Teller spoke for several minutes and discussed how Russian scientists lead a good life and how Russian society uses science very practically in everyday life.
Dr. Teller changed the subject. “Shall I tell you why I want to go to the moon?” he joked.
Mr. Weisl laughed, “Yes, sir.”
Dr. Teller told of the scientific advancement going to the Moon or Mars would hold. Mr. Weisl was more concerned again about Russia and asked Dr. Teller if he thought the Russians would see the Moon as a military endeavor and if the US would find it practical militarily to go to the Moon. “My imagination is not good enough for that,” Dr. Teller responded. The committee discussed assorted topics with Dr. Teller before calling its next witness to give testimony.
The Subcommittee met again the next day and discussed Russia science programs, its economy, use ballistic missiles, and then Project Vanguard.
Project Vanguard was a project lead by Director, Dr. John Hagen who also served as a member of the National Science Foundation. Dr. Hagen would be the Subcommittee’s next witness. Dr. Hagen discussed Project Vanguard and how it was first a science experiment lead by the Department of Defense to launch a satellite for the International Geophysical Year (IGY). The Department of Defense had already done work in atmospheres and the Aerobees and Viking rockets needed to launch the satellites needed to be built at the Naval Research Laboratory. The IGY would last from July 1957 to December 1958. Dr. Hagan described the Viking rocket and the orbit and the space-to-Earth communications of the satellite to the Subcommittee. The satellite uses radio waves to communicate with a ground station. Dr. Hagen reiterated the project was supposed to be off the ground by the end of the IGY.
Mr. Vance asked if the project could be hurried, and Dr. Hagen said there were funding limitations, that ballistic missiles were of a higher priority and the Vanguard satellite program was a secondary priority classification.
Mr.Vance asked, “[Without limitations] do you think that you could have gotten it up ahead of Sputnik I?” Dr. Hagen responded at first hesitantly than responded, “I think that we probably would have come very close to the same time, if not ahead of it.” It was after this questioning Congress had the information it needed to boost the Vanguard project from a low priority science project to a higher security national defense project. Johnson called the committee to order and decided an executive session was needed to meet in the Armed Services Committee Room to hear the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles. Johnson settled the press, “At the conclusion of his testimony I will meet with the press and tell them anything that I may be able to as a result of that testimony…Dr. Hagen, we thank you for indulging us. Counsel, will you proceed with the examination of the witness?”
Dr. Hagen continued to discuss the scientific benefits of the Vanguard Project. Later, Mr. Vance asked Dr. Hagen about the military benefits of Project Vanguard. “…satellites, close-in satellites, can certainly beexcellent aids to navigation. Within the Navy we, have this navigation problem. The problem is not confined of course to the Navy but we are very aware of it. Close-in satellites can help in navigation. They could also help in such things as television relays.
“What are they,” Dr. Vance asked. Dr. Hagen continued, “You can place a satellite in an orbit some 22,000 miles or so above the earth, at which time it has a period of just 1 day.
So you could place it over the United States, for example, and if you instrumented it as a television relay station, you could feed television programs into the satellite and have them rebroadcast to cover the whole of the United States with one transmitter. This is an obvious thing which will be done some day and it certainly has its military advantages.”
Dr. Vance then asked Dr. Hagen about Russian satellites. Dr. Hagen described Sputnik, and described the “decay” process in which satellites are dragged down by the atmosphere and lose orbit and burn up in the atmostphere “just as the meteor does,” Hagen described.
Dr. Hagen discussed the Russian satellite Sputnik with the council and described the kind of propulsion needed to launch the satellite. Senator Johnson was concerned if the American Viking rocket could support such as satellite and Dr. Hagen was not sure, “we were comparing potatoes and peas here when we compare with they are doing with our
Vanguard experiment, because our rocketry for this is not a military rocket, and we should not draw conclusions about our military capabilities in this comparison.” Dr. Hagen continued to describe the physics of the Vanguard project and images were included in the Congressional record.
Senator Johnson thanked Dr. Hagen for his testimony and the Subcommittee hearing ended about 4 pm that November day. The next few days the Subcommittee would hear testimony on ballistics and guided missiles with witnesses from the Department of Defense, the Army and the Army’s Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) including testimony from Dr. Wernher von Braun, Director of Development Operations Division at the ABMA in Huntville, Alabama.
Dr. Werhner von Braun was a man in his mid forties; he had short brown hair, wrinkles on his face from decades studying rocket physics. He sometimes wore glasses. Von Braun was long influenced by the science fiction works of Jules Verne and H.G. Wells and got his start in rocketry working for the German Army working in the ballistic missile division.  He was formerly apart of Hitler’s “rocket team” and built V-2 bombers that used slave labor from a concentration camp in Mittelwerk.  He stood before Congress that Wednesday afternoon and prepared to be questioned about his work for the ABMA and the US’s status on rocket development.
Mr. Weisl began, “Dr. von Braun, you are associated in the German use of the V-2. Will you tell the committee briefly just what your association with the V-2 was?”
Von Braun responded, “The V-2 was the outgrowth of liquid fuel rocket developments that
had been going on in Germany since 1930. In 1930, still as a student, I became associated with the German Society for Space Travel. We built some rather primitive liquid-fuel rockets under the auspices of this society.”
“How old were you at that time, Doctor?” Mr. Weisl asked. “Eighteen,” Von Braun replied.
Von Braun began, “In 1932, about 2 years later, the German Army became interested in our work, but was ready to support us only with the stipulation that we would move behind the fence of an army facility. This is how I became affiliated with the German Army. Under the auspices of the army we first built two smaller liquid fuel rockets, and by 1936 this project had progressed so well that the German Army, jointly with the German Air Force, decided to establish a rocket center on the Baltic Sea, which became the Rocket Center of Peenemuende, and it was there that the V-2 rocket was developed. The actual development work on the V-2 began in early 1940. The first flight tests were made in the spring of 1942, but were unsuccessful. In October 1942, the first successful flight of the V-2 was made. In September 1944, the V-2 went into military operation.”
Mr. Weisl asked, “Dr. von Braun,, will you tell the committee briefly how you managed to escape from the Russians as they were approaching Peenemuende?” Von Braun testified about how the Russian Army was approaching from the East and him and his comrades could hear the artillery fire at night. “It was very obvious to me and my associates that the war was lost…” he said. The group was on the rear of the fighting front, confused about which direction to go. They decided to go west.
“We finally wound up partly in central Germany and partly in Bavaria. There we were ultimately run over by the American Army,” von Braun testified.
“Were you able to escape to the American Army with equipment?” Mr. Weisl asked.
“Yes sir,” von Braun replied. Von Braun continued, “only about 2,000 tons, but I would say the most important equipment, finally wound up in American hands, including the documents covering our scientific and engineering work.”
Mr. Weisl asked, “In other words, you delivered the equipment and documents and all the supporting data you could bring with you to the American Army?”
“That is right,” von Braun replied.
Mr. Weisl asked to what extent had the Russian Army gained German rocketry technology, but von Braun told the committee about how the Russians made poor use of their gained technology and that the Russia ballistic missile program was heavily mismanaged.
“The Russian program wasn’t very convincing, and not really dangerous,” von Braun concluded.
Dr. Weisl responded, “You do not underestimate the ability of the Russians to make and develop and plan and research into the missile field do you?”
“No sir, I don’t,” von Braun replied.
“Do you believe the Russians are ahead of us in this field?” Dr. Weisl asked.
“In the ballistic missile and satellite business, definitely; yes, sir,” von Braun answered.
Mr. Weisl and Dr. von Braun discussed impediments to the missile program for some length. They discussed the unfunded Jupiter missile program and how a larger problem was in engineering. Von Braun discussed his shortage of engineers and surplus of scientists who were not helping the project. Von Braun thought the answer lied with how the missile program was prioritized.
“This is a very fundamental and, I think, a very serious question…” von Braun began, “The question is asked, very simply: ‘Do we need it for the Atlas?’ Answer: ‘No.’ ‘Do we need it for the Titan?” ‘No.’ ‘For the Jupiter?’ ‘No.’ ‘For the Thor?’ ‘No.’ Consequently, there is no need for a big engine.”
Mr. Weisl was interested, “In other words, you agree with General Medaris there is need for an engine with a large thrust?” Von Braun replied, “Yes, sir.”
The testimony continued, “And you join with General Medaris in feeling that
the control of outer space and, I might say, with General Gavin, that the control of outer space is just as important, if not more so, than the development of the ballistic missile?” Mr Weisl asked.
“Sir, I believe that–”
Mr. Weisl pressed, “You join in that belief?”
Dr. von Braun looked cool. “Yes, sir; I do…I am convinced that the Russian concept, as demonstrated by Sputnik No. 2 carrying this animal, is clearly much broader. They consider the control of space around the earth very much like, shall we say, the great maritime powers considered the control of the seas, in the 16th through the 18th century, and they say, ‘If we want to control this planet, we have to control the space around it.’
Mr. Weisl responded, “Then we will discuss outer space with you this afternoon, Dr. von Braun.”
Senator Johnson concluded, “The committee will stand recess until 2:30. The room erupted.
On July 16, 1969, five minutes until liftoff of the Apollo 11 spacecraft, the vehicle went through its usual status checks. The astronauts were busy conducting reports, awaiting confirmation systems were all clear and “go for launch.” Three minutes later, Apollo 11 would lift off and make it to the Moon and back.
We remember the launch and we remember Neil Armstrong’s historic “one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind” words, but how did we get there? How did the US decide to get to the Moon let alone return? What happened during the Apollo Era that would warrant such a decision?
In the 1940s, the US was involved in ballistic missile and atmospheric science, largely with the Huntsville military ballistics program lead by the Army. The US had been interested in science and technology policy largely during this period. The US worked as a technocracy, that is, using government lead technological enterprise as a means to secure the state. The only other country involved in technocratic enterprises during this period was the Soviet Union.
In 1957, the Soviet Union launched an unmanned probe into space, Sputnik, thus effectively creating the world’s first satellite into orbit. The US saw this as a threat to state security and immediately called to order a Congressional hearing to discuss Soviet involvement in space and the US’s role in missile and satellite technology. As Logsdon (1970) tells, proponents of entering the space race saw the US falling into a second-class nation without demonstrating rocketry technology. Rocket technology would effectively show the US had achieved long-range missile capability.
The US had already had plans to launch a satellite into orbit as part of the International Geophysical Year of 1957 under Eisenhower and it called this program Project Vanguard. The US team under Eisenhower viewed this project as a scientific endeavor and did not place this project on top priority until Soviets launched Sputnik. After Sputnik, satellites became a national security issue.
After Congressional hearings with leaders from the Department of Defense, the Navy and the Army, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was formed with the goal of creating an agency that would handle our space crisis. Eisenhower’s first job for NASA was to transport Department of Defense functions to NASA as well as in 1959 transfer the Army ballistics in Huntsville to NASA. NASA would become the agency that handled rocketry sciences lead by Werner Von Braun and no longer in Army hands. The Air Force had also long been interested in human spaceflight specifically for warfare purposes. 
The US was at a race with the Soviet Union for technocratic achievement and after Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space in 1961, the US viewed itself as behind the Soviets technocratically. Many technocratic rationales for beating the Soviets were argued during this period: National prestige, national security, science, and technology.
Logdson (1970) credits the Apollo Mission to President Kennedy, not Eisenhower as Eisenhower wasn’t motivated under the rationales of national prestige, national defense, or science and technology as means to explore space; he saw space as a scientific and futuristic prospect.  Eisenhower did not believe NASA should be motivated by militaristic rationales, like national defense, which was a crucial decision for his making NASA a civilian, not defense Agency.  Kennedy was motivated by these rationales and the decision to go to the Moon is largely credited to him.
The US saw the Apollo mission of landing men on the Moon and returning them safely to Earth as the goal of the Space Race under the guise of boots on the ground in space. The US eventually put man first on the Moon beating the Soviets, however after the Space Race was effectively run, NASA’s Apollo missions ended.
Logsdon (1970) shares that human spaceflight to Eisenhower was seen as a “futurist theater of war” in space and served as a potential to warfare rather than an immediate danger.  Human spaceflight was seen as a low priority and future tier of spaceflight in the Sputnik era of early satellite technology. Wang (2008) credits the President’s Scientific Advisory Council (PSAC) as technological experts as well as skeptics.  PSAC has listed rationales: 1) man’s need to explore space; 2) national defense; 3) national prestige; and 4) science as reasons to explore space. 
Still, PSAC had a human spaceflight agenda on their report, albeit a far shooting one, that included moon bases as an eventuality.  Eisenhower and his advisers viewed human spaceflight as an ending goal, yet satellites as a top priority. As Logsdon (1970) tells, Eisenhower viewed satellites under the rationale of science not defense, and did not approve of space as a defense endeavor; it was Kennedy and Johnson that saw the potential of warfare in space at the human level and reach the decision to go to the Moon.  The Apollo Era was a defense endeavor and men on the Moon was seen as an epic military enterprise, effectively “boots on the ground” type military achievement. This was a futuristic age of scientific pursuits and technocratic progress.
 J. M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest, The MIT Press, 1970.
 Z. Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow: The President’s Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America., Rutgers University Press, 2008.
This article will attempt to study NASA’s budget as a distribution to investigate changes in NASA’s budget from the years 1957-2014 using cutting-edge theories in political science such as measuring for leptokurtosis and applying a predictive distribution. Understanding NASA’s budget changes are the crucial first step in understanding how NASA’s budget may change and proponents of NASA might find whether NASA’s budget has been incremental or show punctuations very useful. This paper will use kurtosis mathematical methods and Robinson (2007) calculations for budget changes.
NASA’s budget has not been fully understood because NASA’s budget has not been a source of scrutiny in the academic literature. The history of studying budgets may be found in political science works such as Jones et al.  yet no one has indeed applied these frameworks to NASA’s budget.
Understanding NASA’s budget will be crucial first step in understanding NASA’s Congressional decision-making process. First, NASA’s empirical budget may be the output to which researchers can calculate back, apply theory, and map the decision-making process. This information will be crucial for proponents looking to get NASA’s budget changed for example.
1.1 Spaceflight in Literature
Prior studies of interest include Steinberg (2011) who studied affect of public opinion on NASA’s budget, finding support for space exploration negatively correlated with NASA budget increases, when properly measuring NASA’s budget as a percentage total of budget . The resulting negative correlation is likely not a relationship worth concern, it is likely that public opinion has no effect on NASA’s budget at all rather than public opinion having a negative effect on NASA spending.
Nadeau (2013) took this correlation a step further and sought predictors for public opinion support for a space exploration budget increase, finding white educated male baby boomers and those who have prior scientific knowledge and education are more likely to support an increase in the federal budget for space exploration. 
Nadeau (2013) improperly understood public opinion to have a desired effect on NASA budget spending changes. Instead, it is of note that of understanding that public opinion has a very negligible effect on spending in Washington due to spaceflight being such a negligible amount on overall US budget spending per a given year and taking up a small policy space on the overall US Federal agenda.
These studies do no address NASA’s budget as a source of investigation, and largely miss the point of spending as a variable to study. Spending is a result of a massive decision-making process and cannot be understood in terms of public opinion alone. Congress has a unique process for decision-making and without studying budget changes, it will be difficult to study the decision-making process.
1.2 Describing NASA’s budget
The first step to understanding NASA budget change is to effectively study NASA’s budget itself. If change is studied as a variable other predictors of change may be found to have an effect. Once these mechanisms are understood, proponents of NASA budget change (increases or decreases) may have what they need to pursue change at the federal level.
This study will continue upon prior studies, but in fact start with NASA’s budget as a distribution and analyze spending over time and apply cutting-edge theory in political science: Incrementalism and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory as a first step to determine ways in which NASA’s budget described.
1.3 Incrementalism and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
Lindbloom (1959) and Wildavsky (1964) argue budgets are incremental, that is, exhibiting little change in allocation . This is largely due to organizational/institutional friction according to Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen (2003) due to opposing forces within the system working against each other for change, resulting in a zero directional output .
Budget allocations are predicted to exhibit little changes because of institutional friction and therefore spaceflight as a policy issue for example would see little change in budget because internal forces cancel out any positive or negative resulting change. The budget would then be incremental, having only small changes per year and never seeing larger changes or shifts in budget spending. After studies measured budget allocations and Incrementalist theory, it was shown budgets in fact are punctuated meaning they show larger changes as incrementalist theory would not have predicted. 
Jones (2009) found budget distributions actually follow an Empirical Law of Budget Distributions such that budgets are predicted to show larger changes, contrary to what was predicted by incrementalist theories of budget allocations.  Jones et al. (2003) modeled this distribution output and showed budgets exhibit signitures of Punctuated Equilibrium Thoery; the observed distribution exhibited leptokurtosis as illustrated with fat tails, sharp central peaks, weak shoulders.  This was contrary to Incrementalist theory and a new branch of political science was thought to understand why, if budgets are incremental, would exhibit large punctuations.
Punctuated Equilibrium results in punctuations in budget, and this is theorized to be because of the lack of policy reprioritizations that arise when government rethinks a policy issue and changes allocation of funding between issues. This would be shown with a decrease or increase in budget per year given policy issue type. A punctuated budget would predict both stability of incrementalism but with rare dramatic changes. The greatest differences between Incrementalist and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory are that in incrementalist theory changes are small and punctuated equilibrium theory means larger changes are to be expected.
This article will attempt to plot NASA’s budget distribution along with a hypothetical distribution and apply Incrementalism and Punctuated Equilibrium theories to the budget distribution to analyze what type of distribution NASA budget allocation has fallen under. Secondly, this article will analyze changes in NASA’s budget and investigate where the changes have occurred and when. Lastly, this paper will discuss implications these findings may have on spaceflight.
We start with 66 observations (one per year of change), NASA’s budget as a percentage change per year over the course of NASA’s history, 1958-2014 as recorded by Policy Agendas Project, now Comparative Agendas Project. I use Policy Agendas Project (updated April 2016) because variables are coded as NASA’s budget rather than Comparative Agendas Project which codes the data under separate policy issues effectively not given NASA’s budget in relation to the total US federal budget. The coding is still consistent over time and effectively isolates NASA’s budget numerically. 
I measure percentage change not in Dollars, but as percent total value. I do this because of the zero-sum of attention per year (limited government funding, caps that force unequal allocation as government cannot attend to every issue by distributing money to it and certainly does not attend to every issue equally). This also helps set an even measure for the US federal budget spending outputs over time.) I use coded values that effectively measure NASA’s budget in entirety. There are 66 observations, one per year of NASA’s historical budget.
2.2 Measuring Kurtosis and Changes
Breunig and Jones (2011) effectively measured budget kurtosis using an L-moments test and K-S test using the observed distribution. We can effectively measure the level of kurtosis in the observed distribution by applying a series of tests, Kurtosis test, K-S test, and increasing tau4 value.  Once these tests are finished, it will be clear if the budget exhibits leptokurtosis as consistent with Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.
Another way to measure whether NASA’s observed budget will exhibit characteristics of Incrementalist or Punctuated Equilibrium theory are to measure the amount of changes in spending. If NASA’s observed budget was plotted against a normal budget and the budget were to be broken into different quadrants where the graph intersects such as Robinson (2007), the count of changes can effectively be measured and then compared to the normal gaussian distribution to see if there is a variance between counts. 
If the observed distribution is plotted against a normal distribution and plotted against a hypothetical distribution using the mean and variance of distribution, than cut points could be made as indicated by True et al.(2011). This was first done by Robinson (2007). The theory is Punctuated characteristics are an increase in the in the expected proportion of small changes, a decrease in the expected proportion of medium changes, and an increase in the expected proportion of large changes. 
3.1 Kurtosis Measurements
If starting at Table 1, it can be shown the discriptive statistics for NASA’s budget distribution output, showing a level of kurtosis given magnitude of the kurtosis, K-S Test, and lastly increasing tau value. The resultant table is conclusive with Punctuated Equilibrium theory such that the values show kurtosis in the distribution. Given test results it is clear the observed distribution of NASA budget changes exhibits characteristics of leptokurthic budget distribution signaling towards Punctuated Equilibrium theory of budget changes.
The second part of the analysis deals with investigating medium changes, and the observe distribution shows less medium changes that expected signifying punctuated characteristics. Given there are only 66 observations and not 1000, looking at large changes is negligible given it takes a significant number of observations for rare occurrences to occur. 
In conclusion, it is clear the observed distribution showed signatures of Punctuated Equilibrium theory, as indicated by the results of the first analysis as shown the descriptive statistics of Table 1. The observed distribution passes the litmus test of whether the distribution shows characteristics of leptokurtosis as predicted by Punctuated Equilibrium theory or a normal distribution as predicted by Incrementalism.
Given table 2, is it clear the budget when applied to the hypothetical distribution shows signs of Punctuated equilibrium theory as shown by the observed proportion of small changes greatly out predicts the hypothetical distribution and the predicted amount of medium changes is less than the amount of observed changes.
Further, it is of note the vast information this data presents and how predictors of budget change may find it as the crucial first step to understanding changes. NASA’s budget distribution exhibits characteristics of Punctuated Equilibrium, not Incrementalism. It is incorrect to describe NASA’s budget as Incremental despite the large numbers of small changes. This is simply not enough of a description. NASA’s budget also shows less medium changes than expected with Incrementalism and predicted by the normal distribution. This can still be because of internal forces cancelling out other forces resulting in small changes in the distribution and lack of medium ones.
What this information presents is that NASA’s budget is due for a large change eventually as predicted by the Law of Empirical budgets. NASA’s budget, given 1,000 observations, is likely to erupt in a large change and will not remain in stasis incrementalism forever. The data already with 66 observations show the budget is punctuated not incremental and therefore change is expected.
 A. Steinberg, Space policy responsiveness: The relationship between public opinion and nasa funding, Space Policy 27:4 (2011) 240–246.
 F. Nadeau, Explaining public support for space exploration funding in america: A multivariate analysis, Acta Astronautica 86 (2013) 158–166.
 S. E. Robinson, Explaining policy punctuations: Bureaucratization and budget change, Midwest Political Science Association 51:1 (2007) 140–150.
 S. T. Jones, Bryan D., H. A. Larsen, Policy punctuations in american political institutions, American Political Science Review 1:1 (2003) 151–169.
 J. B. D. True, J., F. Baumgartner, Punctuated-equilibrium theory: Explaining stability and change in american policymaking, Theories of the policy process (2011) 97–115.
 B. D. Jones, et al., A general empirical law of public budgets: A comparative analysis, American Journal of Political Science 405 (2009) 885–873.
 S. T. Jones, Bryan D., H. A. Larsen, Policy punctuations in american political institutions, American Political Science Review 1.
 F. Baumgartner, B. D. Jones, The Policy Agendas Project, University of Texas at Austin, 2013.
 C. Breunig, B. D. Jones, Stochastic process methods with an application to budgetary data, Political Analysis 19 (2011) 103–117.